vlad.tribnet.com / Issue #562 / Vladivostok by Braille / Reading article...

When you spend some time in Vladivostok, you will notice that many people do not feel a strong connection to their central government in Moscow. Many of them have never visited their own capital, which is not surprising if you consider it takes a nine-hour flight to get there. The newspapers report less than what can be expected about the decisions and policies made in Moscow. I would like to discuss how this can be explained.

Tsarist times
In the pre-Soviet era Russia’s Far East had a special status. Officially it was a part of Russia like any other, colonized by Russians from the west. However, the central government had difficulty controlling the area, because traveling opportunities were limited and therefore communication was difficult. This gave local leaders the chance to go there own way and give their own interpretation to Tsarist orders. In Primorye this means that trade, for instance, was committed with foreign countries unauthorized by Moscow.

Because of the geological location of Primorye it was relatively easy to trade with Asian countries, such as China, Korea and Japan. Local leaders took this opportunity and traded with these countries, without being controlled by the central government. That way Primorye has become more involved with its Asian neighbors then with Moscow. This has evolved in a more independent status for Vladivostok then more western regions had, starting form its foundation in 1860.

The international trading traffic in Vladivostok lured many foreigners to the city. Japanese, Koreans and Chinese traders found their way to this economic center of the region and Vladivostok became a truly international metropolis. Street names like ‘Korean street’, ‘Peking Street’ and ‘Chinese street’ illustrated the international character of the city. These street names were changed in Soviet times. This is no co-incident. With the changing of the street names, also the international character of Vladivostok ceased to exist.

Soviet Times
At first the Revolution of October 1917 only disconnected Primorye further from Moscow. In the chaos following the Revolution the Far East was even less controlled than before. While western Russia was getting isolated from the rest of the world because of its instability, the Far East continued to trade with Asia and kept the ties connected.

With foreign aid from Japan, the United States, England and France, Tsar Nikolai II was able to keep the Bolsheviks out of Vladivostok for a while, but in 1922 the communists took over. When Stalin came to power, Vladivostok’s international days were definitely over. Stalin deported most foreigners. Instead of the trading centre it used to be, Vladivostok became a ‘staple market’ for prisoners. They were held in Vtoraya Rechka, a district in Vladivostok, waiting to be transported to the mines of Kolyma.

In 1958 the city was closed, making it virtually impossible not only for foreigners, but also for Russians, to enter. The fact that Vladivostok is the main base for Russia’s Pacific fleet probably is an important reason for this. Also, Moscow was able to consolidate its power by killing the international character of the city that was left completely. This isolated status continued until 1992, when visitors were welcomed into the city once again. Soon Asians found there way back to Vladivostok like they had done in earlier times, visible today by the many Asian restaurants, stores, market stalls and Chinese construction workers.

Today
How Moscow feels about Primorye leaves no doubt: Russia is not willing to give up any territory, and that includes Primorye. Russia will never just let a part of the country go, as we all can see by what happens in Chechnya. Moscow can not afford to create any precedents. In the case of Primorye, that is not the only reason for Moscow to hold on to it.

Primorye is an area where natural resources are piled up, waiting to be developed. The resources that can be found here are for example tin, coal, fluorite, silver and gold. Enormous profits can be made here, and this is an extra reason for Moscow to make sure Primorye stays ‘in the family’.

All is well, but what does the Primorye population want? Is there even a call for independency, or for more Moscow control? The answer to this question is not one-sided. First, many people seem unsatisfied with the support coming from Moscow. They feel Primorye has to take care of itself, because the feeling is prevalent that Moscow does not care about the people in the Far East. It might above all be a feeling; there is some truth in this vision.

Russia’s central government does not put much effort in keeping its inhabitants on far distance happy. For instance, in 1993 Primorye representatives had to ‘press Moscow for energy aid’, due to the enormous inflation that struck the entire country as a result of Russia’s shock-therapy as a means to establish a market economy. Prices increased drastically and Primorye’s energy suppliers had enormous difficulty getting by. Other regions suffered as well.

Primorye, however, claimed that Moscow had ‘held back promised credit and subsidies to the energy companies Dalenergo and Primorskugol (Primorye Coal Co.) and funds for local power facility construction.’ Whether right or wrong, Primorians felt neglected by Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The same year Primorye even had ideas to reorganize, changing the krai’s status in one of a republic. It would still be part of the Russian Federation, but a political move like this would mean ‘war’ on Moscow, like the one the Chechens were having.

Maybe this signal has urged Moscow to do something. In August 1993 a delegation from Moscow, headed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin came to the Far East. This gesture could not prevent harsh criticism from local residents. In a matter of two days the delegation visited almost the entire Far East including Kamchatka, Sakhalin, Kuriles, Khabarovsky Krai, and Primorye’s cities of Vladivostok, Spassk, and Arsenyev). An ambitious activity, considering the size of the region.

The major problem was that no real problems were addressed. All the talks were kept superficial. This was hard to avoid with a schedule like this one, but the people in the Far East would have liked a little more attention. But as journalist Valery Bakshin wrote: ‘Moscow is far away and doesn’t concern itself with the ailments of the Far East.’

The bone Moscow threw the Far East did not satisfy the people of the Far East. Under the turmoil in Moscow, September 1993 that led to the dissolution of Russia’s parliament by Boris Yeltsin, Primorye residents feared they would even be more neglected. Primorye would have to start over again to get its problems under Moscow’s attention, and all the decisions made during Chernomyrdin’s visit to the Far East would have been in vain.

This fear was confirmed when almost half a year later local unions were still trying to get Moscow to pay Russia’s debts to the local enterprises and to finally send the promised subsidies to Primorye. It can not be said that Primorye was passive, or not trying hard enough to get Moscow’s attention.

In February 1994 Primorye’s governor visited Moscow personally to talk about the problems. In March even bigger steps were taken: Vladimir Chubai of the Primorye Trade Union took the case to Geneva, hoping to have the government forced to pay its dues.

A few years later, in 1998, Primorye faced another problem caused by Moscow. The government failed to let the Krai know in a timely matter what amount of financial help they would receive from Moscow. The Primorye Duma was forced to delay the passage of the 1998 budget by months.

The advantage of this lack of attention is that Primorye was forced to learn to take care of itself. However, some feel that Primorye is not able to continue to do so. For them Primorye - and rest of the Far East - should be more controlled by Moscow.

Primorye sought help from Moscow to prevent profits from leaking to Asia. The fact that Moscow gains more from this situation then Primorye does itself does not prevent some residents to feel safer under these circumstances. Their vision is a little more hostile towards Asia, especially towards China. As anyone who has ever traveled between China and Russia might have noticed, the relationship between these countries is, to say the least, based on a heavy dose of distrust, and as I believe, an amount of jealousy from Russia’s side.

In the last few years, China’s economy has boomed. The Russian regions that border with China feel they need a sort of counterweight for China. With more state control form Moscow they feel safer.

Primorye residents see that China is well on her way to establish a flourishing economy. In the meanwhile, they are constantly begging their central government for financial aid. The fact that China is doing so well, probably makes it harder for Primorians to cope with the idea that their profits are limited because of China’s success. As a counterweight, they like to have Moscow around to jump in anytime necessary.

As posed before, Primorye, but also other Far Eastern regions, can not lay back and expect Moscow’s help to arrive all by itself. Primorye officials have to work hard to get Moscow to listen to them and their problems. I fear people might be right when they say that Russia’s government does not really care for the people in the Far East.

What it does care about is prestige. Recently Vladivostok was given the perfect opportunity to put itself on Moscow’s agenda. Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed this January to have the 2012 APEC-summit (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, with members such as the United States, Australia, China and Vietnam) on Russian Island, Vladivostok. Russia is one of the few APEC-members never to have hosted an APEC-summit and feels it is time for change.

Geographically Vladivostok is probably the most obvious city to have the summit, but before the city is suitable for such an event, a lot has to be done. Therefore plans are being made to build a five-star hotel on Russian Island, to improve both the city’s and the island’s infrastructure and to renovate the airport.

It seems that only when external factors are of influence Moscow is willing to pay much attention to the Far East. The ‘humiliation’ of never having hosted an APEC-summit is probably going to be more effective for Vladivostok’s development then all the efforts done before by Primorye officials.

Until now Primorye always had to scream for Moscow’s help, but when a chance for Russia is given to prove its abilities to host a big event, all of a sudden no costs seem to be spared to get Vladivostok ready. This is a sad thesis, but hopefully it will work out for the best for Vladivostok.